I.

INTRODUCTION
Long-term debt securities, or "bonds," issued to public investors suffer a collective-action problem. Bondholders rarely can act as a cohesive group because the identity of individual bondholders constantly changes, public bonds being actively traded; and any individual bondholder's investment is likely to be relatively small, minimizing economic incentive to take action or cooperate.
1 Custom and law have provided a partial solution to this problem: for each public bond issue, an indenture trustee-the term deriving from the fact that the loan agreement governing a public bond issue is traditionally called an "indenture"-is appointed to act as a type of agent on behalf of the bondholders collectively. [i]n view of the present importance of the subject, it is noteworthy that there should have been so little written upon it in the fifty years during which this field of the law has been developing. Indeed, the payment-default rate for high-yield bonds to rise to approximately three percent by the end of 2007. 12 Moreover, payment-default rates paint only a small part of the picture:
adding non-payment defaults, such as breaches of covenants, the total default rates are certainly far greater than the above data suggest.
This article's inquiry is additionally timely because public bondholder governance is increasingly recognized as a critical component of the larger realm of corporate governance. 13 In the past, Congress and the legal literature have focused predominantly on the aspects of corporate governance related to equity investors. Given more than eighty percent of capital market financing raised by U.S. corporations now occurs through public bond offerings, 14 greater attention should be devoted to public bondholder governance. 11 See Jane Sassen, Junk Keeps Defying Gravity, BUS. WK., at 72 (Jan. 29, 2007) . 12 See Moody's, supra note 9, at 5; Sassen, supra note 11, at 72-73 (reporting the view of a bond market analyst that "the level and severity of defaults may be worse when they finally hit, precisely because weak players are continuing to pile on new debt . . . [and] defaults could eventually approach the [ten percent] rates seen in the early 1990s."). This compares with an average annual default rate since 1983 on high-yield bonds of 4.9 percent and a peak annual default rate since that date of over ten percent. See Moody's, supra note 9, at 4. 13 447, 450 (1999) (arguing the "second dimension to corporate governance" is the "legal rules and economic arrangements that mediate the relationship between the firm and its creditors"). 14 The Standard of Care for Indenture Trustees. Absent default, the indenture trustee's duties to bondholders are straightforward and, indeed, even ministerial. 15 In the event of default, however, those duties are governed by a post-Depression "prudent man"
standard. 16 Both payment and non-payment (sometimes called "technical") defaults trigger the prudent-man standard, 17 on which this article will focus.
Although a prudent-man standard is widely used and well-developed in other legal contexts, 18 it has received scant attention in the trust-indenture context. 19 Indenture trustees for defaulted bonds therefore face the conundrum that they are required to act prudently but lack real guidance on what prudence means. 20 Even worse, this article argues, the limited guidance that exists derives from misplaced judicial reliance on traditional trust law 21 to inform the prudent-man standard. 22 A comparison of the role of indenture trustees in modern securities markets with that of traditional trustees reveals that any analogy between the two is fundamentally misplaced.
23 15 See infra note 45-47 and accompanying text. 16 TIA § 315(c). 17 Cf. infra note 52 and accompanying text (observing that the trust-indenture standard of responsibility is triggered not only by a payment default but also by a technical default such as violation of a covenant). 18 See infra Part III (discussing the prudent-man standard in traditional trust and corporation law). 19 See infra Part II.C (explaining the relevant case law of the prudent-man standard in the trust-indenture context). 20 See LANDAU & KRUEGER, supra note 1, at 171. 21 This article uses the terms "traditional trust law" and "traditional trustee" to refer to what is otherwise known as the common law of trusts or "gratuitous" trusts. 23 See infra Part IV.
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The resulting legal mess-a standard of indenture-trustee performance partially lacking guidance and partially misguided-causes indenture trustees to often devote as much of their energies to avoiding personal liability as to protecting bondholders. 24 It also means that fewer and fewer players are willing to be appointed as indenture trustees and those that are may not always be of the quality needed to protect investors. 25 This is especially unfortunate since post-default situations ideally require the "best and the brightest of the corporate trust area." 26 Furthermore, liability-avoiding strategies often incongruously entail strict enforcement of an indenture's remedial provisions, even when inaction by the indenture 24 This emphasis on avoiding liability is perhaps also partially explained by the traditionally low compensation paid to indenture trustees. The low compensation itself may indicate a fundamental market defect, at least part of the explanation for which may be investors' expectations that the bonds in which they invest will not default, thereby discounting any expected benefit of a highly skilled indenture trustee. For a valuable discussion of market failures in contract law due to cognitive limitations, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 216 (1995) (explaining, inter alia, that people often fail to make rational choices in contracts because they "are unrealistically optimistic"). 25 Cf. Trustee-After-Default.doc trustee might be the optimal course for bondholders. 27 For example, strict enforcement could unnecessarily force the issuer into bankruptcy, which might result in less recovery for bondholders than an out-of-court restructuring. 28 If the indenture trustee does not act, however, "it will most likely be liable for negligence." 29 The indenture trustee therefore frequently finds itself between the proverbial Scylla and Charybdis-having to decide between forcing the issuer into bankruptcy on one side and facing potential liability for inaction on the other.
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These deficiencies in the post-default governance of public bond issues by indenture trustees contrast unfavorably with the increasingly sophisticated post-default behavior of lenders on private debt. 31 Although it is possible that these private-lender 27 See, e.g., LANDAU & KRUEGER, supra note 1, at 138 (observing that "the [T]rustee may logically be inclined to take immediate action under the remedial provisions [of the indenture] to avoid being subjected to substantial potential liability"). 28 See SPIOTTO, supra note 26, XII-14:
[T]he indenture trustee should be aware that, at times, it may be in the best interests of the holders to be patient and not to proceed immediately to litigation or other remedies. Complete liquidation or acceleration of debt may not always be in the best interest of the obligor and may adversely affect the obligor's ability to resolve its problems. A forced sale or acceleration may actually impair the security of the holders and cause the bondholders to recover less. This article explores how the standard of indenture-trustee responsibility should be modified to make indenture trustees more effective. Instead of looking to the duties of traditional trustees, the article shows that the post-default duty of an indenture trustee-to increase bondholder recovery-is functionally the same as the duty of corporate directors to increase shareholder return. 35 In that context, courts have devised a "business judgment" rule to protect corporate directors from the same chilling effects of potential liability faced by indenture trustees. This article contends that a similar rule, superimposed on the indenture trustee's prudent-man standard, would help to correct existing governance deficiencies and achieve some of the unrealized goals of the TIA, while lowering the cost of public debt and providing greater protection for bondholders.
The article proceeds by first explaining, in Part II, the statutory framework of the TIA and the post-default prudent-man standard applicable to indenture trustees. The article then examines, in Part III, the prudent-man standard in other contexts, including 32 See id. at 1246-47 (detailing some post-default actions by private creditors that should benefit junior lenders, such as bondholders). 33 See id. at 1245 (explaining that the private lenders "who wield control" over defaulted debtors are "typically also the most senior" creditors). 34 Cf. 36 Being widely dispersed, bondholders had difficulty coordinating concerted action 37 ; and because they had relatively small individual claims, bondholders lacked the incentive to incur the costs to overcome the problems caused by dispersion.
Furthermore, this lack of incentive also made individual action by bondholders 36 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing today's bondholder collectiveaction problem). 37 See TIA § 302(a)(1) ("concerted action by such investors in their common interest through representatives of their own selection is impeded by reason of the wide dispersion of such investors through many States, and by reason of the fact that information as to the names and addresses of such investors generally is not available to such investors."). (2) is to require unanimous consent for changes of the indenture's payment terms). Consent solicitations are sometimes used by issuers to amend the payment terms in an indenture. These solicitations are both time-consuming and extraordinarily expensive for an issuer. 55 Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1003-04. 56 Section 315(d)(3) of the TIA states: the "indenture shall automatically be deemed (unless it is expressly provided therein that any such provision is excluded) to contain provisions protecting the indenture trustee with respect to any action taken or omitted to be taken by it in good faith in accordance with the direction of the holders of not less than a majority in principal amount of the indenture securities at the time outstanding . . . ."
Trustee-After-Default.doc the indenture trustee that entails a degree of risk. 57 In practice though, obtaining direction from bondholders, especially in large public bond issues, is often impossible 58 and, even where possible, entails significant expense.
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In most cases, therefore, indenture trustees cannot rely on bondholders for direction. The indenture trustee then is faced with a myriad of difficult choices. For example, it may have to decide whether (and, if so, when) to try to obtain collateral from the issuer to secure unsecured bonds and what might be offered as a quid pro quo. The indenture trustee also may need to decide whether (and, if so, when) to enforce remedies contained in the indenture, such as accelerating maturities, demanding specific performance of covenants, or-in the case of a payment default-simply suing for any overdue principal or interest.
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If the bonds are secured, the indenture trustee faces additional choices presented by the option of foreclosing on the collateral. 61 Structured-finance and securitization transactions present further choices, 62 such as deciding whether to exercise remedies (for 57 See SPIOTTO, supra note 26, XI-5 (advising "[b]efore exercising remedies or taking action against the obligor in a situation where the recovery is questionable and the source of the indenture trustee fees and expenses are not free from doubt, a wise trustee will seek to receive the written direction, instruction and indemnity of a majority of the holders."). 58 See id. XII-13. 59 [cite] 60 See id. XII-1-5. 61 See id. XII-6. 62 The TIA applies to many structured finance products; however, because the TIA only applies to publicly issued debt securities, it does not apply to many common securitization transaction where the "SPV issues equity securities" or whenever the securities, regardless of whether they are debt or equity, are privately placed. See FRANKEL, supra note 7, § 12.26; American Bankers Association, Corporate Trust Committee, The Trustee's Role in Asset-Backed Securities (Mar. 12, 2003) ("a significant portion of all asset-backed transaction documents are not [qualified under the TIA]; they do not impose upon the trustee after the occurrence of a default anything more than its pre-default ministerial duties.").
Trustee-After-Default.doc example, notifying obligors or taking over servicing and collection activities) against the financial assets backing the securities.
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Where bankruptcy is a possibility, the indenture trustee's choices can further multiply. Most critically, an indenture trustee may have to decide whether to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition. 64 It may also need to decide, for example, when to join an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the issuer. Once an issuer is in bankruptcy, the indenture trustee may need to decide whether to join a creditors' committee 65 or, especially where the bonds are subordinated, to attempt to form a separate creditors'
committee. The indenture trustee usually will not be able to vote on a bankruptcy reorganization plan but may have the opportunity to object to such a plan. 66 If the bonds are secured, the indenture trustee also may need to decide whether to make a motion to lift the automatic stay and when to request adequate protection. 67 Additionally, the
In many structured finance transactions that are not qualified under the TIA, an indenture trustee is included but it is required to take post-default actions only in "accordance with the transaction documents . . . in order to limit the trustee's personal liability and reinforce the notion that the trustee is not responsible for taking any independent action." Sheilah D. indenture trustee may need to decide whether to invest funds that it holds during a bankruptcy proceeding.
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In the event the company selling financial assets (the "originator") in structuredfinance and securitization transactions enters bankruptcy, the indenture trustee will have the primary responsibility to ensure "continued collection of proceeds of transferred receivables" and to protect investors from "attempts of the originating seller . . . to extend the terms of the securitization or to use the receivables as its cash collateral, or to secure new financing during the bankruptcy in part based upon the receivables transferred to the SPV." 69 The indenture trustee may also need to defend the "true sale" nature of the securitization to prevent the receivables from reverting back to the bankrupt originator.
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These are just examples of the many decisions that post-default circumstances may warrant. Regardless of the indenture trustee's choice, in each of these post-default cases its actions are required to adhere, and will be measured in retrospect by reference, to the prudent-man standard of the TIA.
C. The Prudent-Man Standard of the Trust Indenture Act
As discussed, the TIA's prudent-man standard requires the indenture trustee, after default, to use the same degree of care and skill in exercising rights and powers under the 315(c) for waiting too long to make a motion to lift the automatic stay in the bankruptcy of Eastern Airlines, as well as failure to take other measures to obtain additional security); Bluebird Partners v. First Fidelity Bank, 85 F.3d 970, 972 (2d Cir. 1996) (dismissing a claim, for lack of standing, by bondholders against their indenture trustees for not filing a motion to lift the automatic stay earlier in the bankruptcy of Continental Airlines 
III. THE PRUDENT-MAN STANDARD IN OTHER CONTEXTS
The "prudent man" is a well-known standard in traditional trust law and corporation law. As a general proposition, courts often look to analogous areas of law as needed to assess fiduciary-like responsibilities. 88 The application of analogical reasoning to fiduciary relationships is suspect, however, absent an explanation of "why some . 85 See infra Part V (discussing in greater detail these proposed reforms). This article discusses the common law of trusts, however, one could also look to the law developed for ERISA plans. The federal ERISA statute uses a similar prudentman standard and courts rely heavily on traditional trust law to interpret the statute. See Gregg v. Transportation Workers of America International, 343 F.3d 833, n.3 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating, for the purpose of the ERISA statute, "[c]ourts define 'prudent person' as that term is employed in the common law of trusts."). 96 Modern trust law remains closely tied to its "ancient use" when "[t]he use was a passive trust" merely designed to safeguard property-the duties of the feoffee, the predecessor of the trustee, "were almost entirely negative duties. . . . No active duties and no powers were implied merely because of the relationship." SCOTT, supra note 95, § 164, at 251.
Trustee-After-Default.doc should refrain from exposing trust beneficiaries to unreasonable risks. Thus, the traditional trust law duty focuses more on preserving, rather than increasing, the value of the assets held in trust.
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Traditional trust law does impose certain affirmative duties on trustees, including "to make trust property productive" 98 through "prudent" investments. 99 These duties are generally satisfied, however, by investing merely to preserve the purchasing power of the trust. 100 Indeed, some believe that a trustee can satisfy these duties only "by passively The new MBCA removes the phrase "prudent person" and replaces it with a distinct duty of care: "the members of the board of directors . . . when becoming informed in connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances." Id., §8.30(b). In explaining this modification, the Official Comments explain: the use of the phrase 'ordinarily prudent person' is a basic guideline for director conduct, suggesting caution or circumspection vis-à-vis danger or risk, [and] has long been problematic given the fact that risk-taking decisions are central to the director's role. When coupled with the exercise of 'care,' the prior text had a familiar resonance long associated with the field of tort law. . . . For this reason, its use in the standard of care for directors, suggesting that negligence is the proper determinant for measuring deficient (and thus actionable) conduct, has caused confusion and misunderstanding. Notwithstanding the variations in legal standards set out by judges, fiduciary cases under state trust law, ERISA, and corporate law make very similar factual examination. They scrutinize the fiduciary's information gathering and evaluation process to determine whether alternative courses of action were weighed and the effects of all possibilities projected; whether the fiduciaries sought a range of expert opinions, inquired into the grounds for those opinions, and made their own personal evaluation as well; whether the fiduciaries permitted themselves to be rushed into a 
IV. RE-THINKING THE INDENTURE TRUSTEE'S DUTY AND STANDARD OF CARE
The prudent-man standard determines how an actor should perform his or her duties. The first step of any analysis thus must focus on the duty to which the actor is subject. In the trust-indenture context, that duty-which falls on the indenture trustee-is at least to try to preserve the amount that bondholders could recover at the time of default. 126 That duty also may, and perhaps should, extend to trying to increase that amount. 127 In traditional trust law, that duty-which falls on the trustee-is to preserve the value of the trust's assets for the trust's beneficiaries. 128 In corporation law, that decision or demanded the time to make a reasonable inquire; whether the fiduciaries imposed conditions on the transaction to protect the beneficiary or shareholders; and whether the fiduciaries monitories the implementation of their decisions.
Cf. LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN
RULE 36 (1986) (explaining that ERISA and trust law, where similar prudent-man standards apply, "tend also to emphasize process in language similar to business judgment rule cases.").
125 KRIKORIAN, supra note 124, at 290. 126 See LNC Investments v. First Fidelity Bank, 173 F.3d 454, 462 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Trustees' duty to the Bondholders was . . . to act prudently to safeguard the assets of the Trust.") (emphasis added). 127 See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 632 N.Y.S.2d 520, 528 (1st Dep't 1995) (stating the indenture trustee's duty is to "exercise his contractually conferred rights and powers in order to secure the basic purpose of any trust indenture, the repayment of the underlying obligation.") (emphasis added); SPIOTTO, supra note 26, XVIII-1 (stating the "indenture trustee's role is to obtain the best recovery possible for the holders under the circumstances."); LANDAU & KRUEGER, supra note 1, at 171 (stating "the trustee should see that the security holders realize their claims in full or to the greatest extent possible."). 128 See infra Part III.A.
duty-which falls on corporate directors-is to take calculated risks in order to maximize corporate profitability. 129 Once the applicable duty is properly defined, and assuming all else is equal, that duty should be a principal driver of how to apply the prudent-man standard.
The analysis in this Part first shows that the indenture trustee's duty should be to increase the potential return to bondholders in the event of default, rather than merely to safeguard existing value. To this extent, the indenture trustee's duty is much more analogous to that of a corporate director than a traditional trustee. Based on this analogy, the article hypothesizes that a business judgment rule also should be applied to the actions of indenture trustees. The article then tests this hypothesis.
A. The Indenture Trustee's Duty-Beyond Safeguarding Assets
There is a lack of specificity in existing law as to whether an indenture trustee's duty, after default, is merely to safeguard existing value or to increase the potential return to bondholders to try to get them paid in full. The Second Circuit, for example, does not appear to distinguish between a duty "to safeguard the assets" and a duty to secure "repayment of the underlying obligation." 130 The distinction, however, is akin to the difference between the duty of a traditional trustee to preserve trust property and the duty of a corporate director to maximize corporate value.
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129 See infra Part III.B.
130 LNC Investments v. First Fidelity Bank, 173 F.3d 454, 462 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating the indenture trustee's duty is "to act prudently to safeguard the assets of the Trust," but in making that statement relying on a New York Appellate Court's statement that the indenture trustee's duty is to "exercise his contractually conferred rights and powers in order to secure the basic purpose of any trust indenture, the repayment of the underlying obligation.") (emphasis added). 131 See supra Parts III.A and III.B (describing the duties of traditional trustees and corporate directors, respectively).
To understand this difference in the trust-indenture context, consider that, postdefault, bondholders ordinarily will not be paid in full (much less receive an increased amount) unless the issuer is able to regain solvency (or decrease its insolvency).
Bondholders thus effectively become senior residual claimants of the issuer-residual claimants because payment of the insolvent portion of bond claims depends on the issuer increasing the value of its assets, and senior residual claimants because bondholder claims, as debt claims, will have priority over shareholder interests. 132 To help the issuer regain solvency, as well as to thread through the intricacies of the default and possible bankruptcy process, bondholders rely on the skills and abilities of indenture trustees to recover bond value, and thus bondholders presumably should value those skills and abilities much more than in a pre-default scenario.
If the trust-indenture duty is simply to try to preserve the amount that bondholders could recover at the time of default, then it is like that of traditional trusts insofar as it involves merely preserving value. To this extent, it should be a positive duty albeit one that involves fairly ministerial efforts. 133 One might even argue the required affirmative efforts should be less under trust-indenture law than traditional trust law because preserving value is more critical under traditional trust law since beneficiaries of traditional trusts have no ability to diversify their ownership of trust assets. 134 In contrast, bondholders can choose, much like corporate shareholders, how much, if anything, to invest in any given corporation and can easily re-sell publicly-issued bonds, enabling 132 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (establishing the priority of payments in bankruptcy). 133 In the pre-TIA era, publicly issued bonds were often fully secured. See Lev, supra note 6, at 51-52. Thus, the indenture trustee's duty was to safeguard the value of bondholders' security interest, which explains why a pre-TIA article stated the indenture trustee's post-default duty required "various affirmative courses of conduct . . . for the preservation of the security." Posner, supra note 3, at 204. Publicly issued bonds, however, are rarely fully secured in modern times.
[cite] 134 Cf. Robert Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565 (2003) (arguing that corporation law imposes a less stringent standard on directors than does trust law on trustees because shareholders can easily diversify but trust beneficiaries may or may not be able to do so).
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On the other hand, if the trust-indenture duty is to increase the potential return to bondholders to try to get them paid in full, the duty would resemble that of a corporate director, other things being equal. Before analyzing whether the indenture-trustee duty is merely to preserve value or, rather, to increase potential return, one must examine whether other things are indeed equal.
The only other factor that appears to be relevant to that examination is the nature of the parties being protected by indenture trustees under the prudent-man standard. If the nature of those parties is similar to that of the parties being protected by the prudentman standard in traditional trust law, the analogy could fail. If, however, the nature of those parties is similar to that of the parties being protected by the prudent-man standard under corporation law, the analogy would be strong.
In traditional trust law, those parties could be anyone and often are individuals, even minors. When the TIA was enacted in 1939, most bondholders were also individuals and other small investors. It therefore would have been more reasonable at that time, based solely on the identity of the protected parties, to view the indenture trustee's role as more akin to the role of trustees under traditional trust law. 135 In recent 135 The evidence from the legislative history of the TIA certainly supports the proposition that Congress intended the TIA's prudent-man standard to be substantially the same as the prudent-man standard applied in the field of personal trusts. it is the role of the indenture trustee to help maximize the return to holders, once a default or troubled situation has occurred. The indenture trustee must insure compliance with the terms of the indenture and when compliance cannot be achieved, the indenture trustee's role is to obtain the best recovery possible for the holders under the circumstances. Recall the reasons that justify the business judgment rule in corporation law. 143 In that context, equity investors voluntarily put their money at risk and therefore expect a return on their investment. Because of this expectation, the business judgment rule attempts to grant corporate directors the flexibility necessary to fulfill their duty by engaging in "venturesome business activity." 144 Similarly, the indenture trustee's duty to increase value, rather than merely preserve it, requires the freedom to take calculated risks. 145 To the extent it can influence the amount of recovery, the indenture trustee should be able to choose courses of action that yield the highest expected value to bondholders (up to, of course, the value needed for full repayment) rather than those that preserve value with the least amount of risk. This same principle-maximizing expected value-also serves as a key justification for the business judgment rule.
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In contrast, one reason why courts have refused to extend the full protection of the 143 See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text. 144 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 106, § 4.01, comment c. Corporate directors are given broad discretion to engage in risky actions because "shareholders to a very real degree voluntarily undertake the risk of bad business judgment; investors need not buy stock, for investment markets offer an array of opportunities less vulnerable to mistakes in judgment by corporate officers." BLOCK, supra note 112, at 8 (quoting Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 490, 507 n.14 (1986)). 145 Cf. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 1233-46 (discussing the calculated risks that creditors generally take after default to try to increase recovery on their claims). 146 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
business judgment rule to traditional trustees 147 is because traditional trusts exist "to provide security for their beneficiaries-not to engage in venturesome business." 148 The business judgment rule also exists to encourage highly-skilled professionals to accept positions on corporate boards. Although post-default situations require the "best and the brightest of the corporate trust area," 149 the market currently appears to face a lack of supply of indenture trustees capable of navigating the unchartered waters of post-default actions. 150 This is certainly an unintended result of the TIA, which was designed to provide bondholders with a higher quality and "conscientious"
representative. 151 As it does in corporate law, application of the business judgment rule in the trust-indenture context should encourage a higher caliber of individuals to assume indenture trustee positions by allowing them the freedom to exercise their discretionultimately providing greater bondholder protection.
In corporation law, the business judgment also serves to preserve the "ultimate decision-making authority" of the board. Although the TIA's system of bondholder governance does not give the indenture trustee plenary power to make all decisions for bondholders, application of the business judgment rule should ultimately lead to a more efficient system of bondholder governance. 152 To minimize the inefficiency caused by the collective-action problem, the TIA gives indenture trustees a variety of powers to act on behalf of bondholders in the event of default. The protection afforded by the business judgment rule should lead to indenture trustees more actively (and effectively) exercising these powers, mitigating the need for costly and less efficient decision-making actions (e.g., individual bondholders acting on their own 153 ; the indenture trustee's refusal to act until it receives direction from the bondholders 154 ; or the indenture trustee's refusal to exercise its discretion, opting instead to automatically enforce the indenture's available remedies 155 ).
The need for a business judgment rule also rests on the impracticality of courts and juries having to evaluate the "prudence" of complex business decisions made by corporate directors. For a variety of professional services (e.g., medical doctors and traditional trustees), professionals will be able to "shield themselves from liability . . . by showing that they followed accepted protocols or practices." 156 As would occur if the prudent-man standard were governed by traditional trust law, or if such standard were (as presently) so ambiguous that indenture trustees so acted to avoid the potential for liability. Cf. supra note 76 and accompanying text. 164 The one aspect of applying the business judgment in the trust-indenture context that could raise the cost of debt is the entry of higher quality indenture trustees. However, considering the benefits that would be provided by higher quality indenture trustees, the net effect should be a lower cost of debt. 165 See supra note 118. 166 Section 315(d)(2) provides that each "indenture shall automatically be deemed (unless it is expressly provided therein that any such provision is excluded) to contain provisions protecting the indenture trustee from liability for any error of judgment made in good faith by a responsible officer or officers of such trustee, unless it shall be proved that such trustee was negligent in ascertaining the pertinent facts. It therefore appears that the prudent-man standard for indenture trustees after default should be tempered by a business judgment rule that includes a presumption against liability as well as a gross-negligence liability threshold. As a final step in the analysis, however, it is appropriate to compare this approach with possible alternatives.
V. ALTERNATIVES
Are there viable alternatives to this article's proposal for solving the deficiencies McDaniel, Esq., an indenture practitioner, questioned the Act's continued utility and supported its repeal, while SunTrust Capital Markets President and CEO R. Charles Shufeldt, testifying on behalf of the ABA Securities Association, argued that the Act still served a useful purpose and opposed repeal. Columbia University Professor of Law John C. Coffee, Jr. testified that there was a 'plausible case for repealing much of the statute' but cautioned Congress to retain necessary protections for bondholders in some form."). 169 Deregulating Capital Markets, supra note 84 (statement of Morey W. McDaniel).
That proposal, however, is at least partially predicated on the existing deficiencies in indenture-trustee post-default governance. 170 If those deficiencies are fixed, as this article suggests, the argument to eliminate the TIA's mandatory trustee requirement becomes less compelling.
Eliminating the TIA's mandatory trustee requirement also would not squarely address the bondholder-governance deficiencies described in this article. Such deficiencies result from the collective-action problem of bondholder governance, irrespective of whether indenture trustees are voluntarily appointed or mandatory.
171
Therefore, for bond issues that continue to rely on indenture trustees-and we believe many would continue to rely 172 -these deficiencies would remain.
B. Enhancing the Indenture Trustee's Statutory Powers
The call for greater indenture trustee power is best illustrated by the "supertrustee" proposal of Professors Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade, and Marcel
Kahan. 173 Their central argument is that public bond indentures should contain more covenants, with the goal of lowering agency costs by increasing monitoring of the 170 See id. 171 See supra notes 1-2 & 36-39 and accompanying text (indicating that the deficiencies in bondholder governance preceded the TIA's mandatory-trustee requirement). 172 Many public bond issues would likely continue to rely on indenture trustees because a bond issue that starts out with specific institutional investors will eventually have different investors as the bonds are traded. Even if all the new investors are institutions, some may want the protection of an indenture trustee. A bond issue's failure to have an indenture trustee thus is likely to reduce the trading value of the bonds. Furthermore, any initial belief by investors that they will work together in the event of a default is undermined by the fact that, under the indirect holding system for securities, the actual beneficial owners of publicly-traded bonds will be difficult, costly, and time-consuming to identify. See supra note 1. 173 Amihud, Garbade, & Kahan, supra note 13. The "supertrustee" proposal has been criticized for taking too much power away from the bondholders in return for greater efficiency. 178 More fundamentally though, the proposal's baseline assumption, that publicly-issued bonds should contain more covenants, is questionable. Covenants represent a trade-off between a debtor's financial flexibility and reduction of agency costs. 179 An issuer may be willing to pay more to retain financial flexibility, and public bondholders appear to often prefer higher interest rates to the monitoring and protective features of covenants. 180 Reforming the TIA to empower supertrustees in order to encourage greater indenture covenants would be very much the tail wagging the dog.
information one cannot obtain bondholder consent. Furthermore, usually only the issuer and its underwriters negotiate the indenture terms.
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There therefore appear to be no viable alternatives to this article's proposal to judge indenture trustee post-default performance by a business judgment rule.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Instead of effectively representing public bondholders, indenture trustees are at best only marginal, and sometimes even counterproductive, participants in most postdefault situations. This article has argued that such poor performance results from ambiguity over the "prudent man" standard imposed on indenture trustees under the Trust Indenture Act, as well as concern that an indenture trustee's liability under that standard may be strictly judged by reference to traditional trust law.
Comparing the role of indenture trustees to that of traditional trustees and corporate directors, this article shows that, after default, an indenture trustee acts-or at least should act-more like a corporate director, taking calculated risks to try to maximize the value paid to bondholders. To induce indenture trustees to take such risks, the article contends that the prudent-man standard of indenture trustee post-default performance should be tempered by a business judgment rule not unlike that applied to the performance of corporate directors, including a presumption against liability as well as a gross-negligence liability threshold. Some may counter, however, that although such a rule would go far to resolve the collective-action problem of bondholder governance, its flexibility might exacerbate the agency-cost problem (in that indenture trustees would be less closely subject to bondholder wishes). The net effect could be tested empirically, however, by comparing the prices of defaulted bonds before and after implementing such a business judgment rule. For the reasons discussed in this article, we believe that any such comparison will
show that applying a business judgment rule to indenture trustees will lower the cost of public debt while, at the same time, providing public bondholders with greater, not less, protection.
